



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

its office in the unknown drama, in the mystery of the future. At present, however, there are but two forces which struggle for mastery in Europe, — Rome and Moscow. Unlike the dominion of Alexander, or Charlemagne, or Tamerlane, or Napoleon, the empire of Russia has never been dependent upon a single life. The Czar is not a person. Like the Pope, the Czar is an idea. But between Pope and Czar there is ever a third party intervening, — who shall say with what success in the end? — which, like the Litæ in Homer, shrivelled and squint-eyed, limps after the mighty of earth, — which, soft-footed as Ate, knowing neither remorse nor rest, sweeps over the heads of mortals from land to land, accomplishing ever the fate which pursues them that will withhold the rights of men, — that third party, it is the Chorus of the Eumenides, — it is Revolution.

- 
4. — *Field Tactics for Infantry: comprising the Battalion Movements, and Brigade Evolutions, useful in the Field, on the March, and in the Presence of the Enemy.* By BRIG.-GEN. WILLIAM H. MORRIS, U. S. Vols., Late U. S. Second Infantry. New York: D. Van Nostrand. 1864. 18mo. pp. 146.

TACTICS are not merely the drill, but the art of manœuvring troops in action, in the presence of the enemy; and include their formation in battalions, or battle array. Briefly, then, tactics consist in arranging troops in those orders or methods which enable them to use their arms with the greatest effect.

The first weapons invented by man to destroy his fellow-man were probably the club, the bow and arrow, the sling, the knife, and afterwards the sword. The art of war was yet in its infancy, and the rude combats of early days were fought without regard to military array or order, and decided rather by strength and courage than by skill. The nomadic tribes of Asia and Northern Africa were the first to use the horse in warfare. Their soldiers were mounted on fleet, hardy horses, and armed with the bow and sling. Hovering in clouds around an enemy, they endeavored to destroy him by flights of arrows and missiles, and to appall by apparently impetuous and fiery charges, without ever actually coming to blows. At this day, the Apaches and Camanches of New Mexico, and other nomadic tribes of Indians roaming over the vast plains between the Mississippi and the Pacific, armed with similar weapons, use precisely the same tactics.

Armed chariots, drawn by three or four horses, yoked side by side, and elephants with scythes to mow down the opposing ranks, were also

used by the Asiatics, but history speaks of them in too uncertain a manner to enable us to draw conclusions as to their tactics; and they were swept away by the rude shock of the Greek and Roman armies.

In the warfare of these nations, who in turn overthrew all their enemies, and conquered the then known world, the sword and the spear ranked first, as the most effective and destructive weapons, and formed the armament of certainly three fourths of their troops. They had indeed a sort of light infantry, the *pellastes* of the Greeks, and the *levis armatura* of the Romans, equipped with bows, slings, and light javelins for hurling, which corresponded to the skirmishers of the present day, but they were little felt in battle. Their cavalry, too, never attained much importance, and, like the "light-armed," was chiefly used for ravaging the invaded country, and skirmishing. It was their heavy-armed infantry which conquered the world. Their defensive armor rendered missile weapons comparatively harmless. The combat was decided by the hand-to-hand shock of the sword and spear, and to render that shock irresistible while guarding against the effects of the enemy's attacks was, in those days, the perfection of tactics. Accordingly, the ancient troops were formed in masses many ranks deep, which overthrew the opposing forces by their mere weight and impetus. Such were the famous Greek phalanxes, sixteen ranks in depth, with the spears of the rearmost rank extending several feet in front of the first, which overthrew and scattered the Persian hosts like chaff before a whirlwind. But the phalanx, irresistible in the charge, from its weight and compactness, was powerless when in disorder, or when taken in flank.

The Romans, during their long and incessant wars, brought the tactics of the sword and spear to their highest perfection. With them the order of battle was in three lines, drawn up one behind the other, each line eight ranks in depth. While each line possessed the necessary mass and weight for the charge, it was more easily rallied when in disorder, and the disasters of the first could be retrieved by the second and third.

With the irruptions of the Northern barbarians, and the advent of the Dark Ages, Roman tactics, perfected and proved in so many fierce and bloody battles, disappeared with Roman civilization. It is difficult, from the confused records which have come down to us, to gain an accurate notion of the tactics practised during the Middle Ages.

By the invention of gunpowder, and the introduction of the musket and of cannon, a new system was rendered necessary. Defensive armor, no longer impenetrable by missiles when made of iron and lead and projected with all the force of gunpowder, had to be laid aside. The line of battle was reduced from many ranks to three, and then to two,

as the increasing destructiveness of fire-arms lessened the efficiency of the mass in the charge.

For a long time after its introduction, the musket was only a missile weapon, and comparatively useless in hand-to-hand fighting, for which the sword and the pike (the successor to the spear) were used. In Marlborough's days, and even in Frederick the Great's, no aim was taken. The musket was pointed from the breast instead of the shoulder, and the officers, with their swords, would level the line of barrels to prevent their men from firing too high. A portion of the troops were still armed with the pike and sword, being destined to make the charges, and for close quarters, as those provided with the musket were intended for defensive or stationary fighting; and while the pikemen were unable to withstand the fire of the musketeers, the latter were helpless when charged hand to hand by the former. They were consequently placed together for mutual support, and were equally indispensable in the formation of armies.

The invention of the bayonet, however, by rendering the musket a hand-to-hand as well as a missile weapon, soon banished the pike. It was at length discovered that picked men, good marksmen, sent out singly, or in small parties, could render essential service by annoying the enemy. Hence arose the system of skirmishing. And in the development of this branch, the American colonists, taught by their Indian wars, and the patriots who fought the Revolutionary war and won our independence, were the pioneers. The British column, driven in disgraceful retreat from Lexington by a few farmers skirmishing each "on his own hook," was a lesson often repeated during our protracted struggle for national life and liberty, and one which the citizen soldiers of revolutionary and republican France were the first to heed.

Halleck in his "Elements of Military Art and Science," says: "Before the French Revolution, all the infantry, formed by regiments and brigades, was united in a single body, and drawn up in two lines. The cavalry was placed on the two flanks, and the artillery was distributed along the entire line. In moving by wings, they formed four columns, two of cavalry and two of infantry; in moving by a flank they formed only two very long columns." These tactics developed the musketry fire to its fullest extent, but were the worst adapted to the use of the bayonet. The wars of the French Republic and Empire under Napoleon wrought almost as great a revolution in the tactics as in the civil and social polity of Europe. Instead of forming a whole army in a single huge, unwieldy body, and that deployed in one or two long, thin lines, incapable of attack, and weak to defend, troops were organized into divisions of eight or ten thousand men, composed of the three

arms in proper proportions, and each containing, in itself, all that belongs to a separate army, and equally able to operate independently, either on the offensive or defensive. This formation is exactly analogous to that of the Roman legion, and restored to modern warfare all, and more than all, the mobility of the Roman armies, which, equally with their discipline and tactics, was the cause of their military success. To this mobility, and their almost invariable custom of attacking, the continued success of the French during the greater part of these wars is to be attributed. Discarding the fire of the musket, they relied much on the bayonet for the attack, and, advancing to the charge in deep column, covered by clouds of skirmishers, which annoyed and drew the fire of the enemy, would carry the strongest positions without firing a shot. As may be supposed, these columns frequently lost tremendously. Marshal McDonald, at the battle of Wagram, led a column of fifteen thousand men, but fifteen hundred of whom remained unscathed; but he penetrated and broke the enemy's centre, and won the day. Such very dense columns, however, were rarely used, and even then sometimes failed, as was the case with Ney's column at Waterloo. Tremendous and almost irresistible in their impulsion, like the ancient phalanx, they were unwieldy, and powerless when taken in flank, while among troops so massed artillery made terrible ravages.

By the stern experience of these titanic wars, the bayonet and the column were proved to be the means for the attack, the musket and the line, which developed its fire to the fullest extent, for the defence. And these tactics have come down to our day. Then, however, the rifle was unknown in warfare. The troops were armed with the musket, having a range of effective fire limited to one hundred and fifty yards. In firing at an object six hundred yards distant, the recruit was taught to aim one hundred and thirty feet above it. Now, a line of battle six hundred or even eight hundred yards distant is completely within effective range of the service rifled musket. In cannon, too, the disparity between those used in the wars of Napoleon and our modern guns is equally great. And besides the increased range of rifled guns, their mobility and consequent efficiency and destructiveness have been quadrupled by improvements in the weight of the piece and the structure of the carriage. These great improvements in the range and death-dealing power of fire-arms have augmented tenfold the difficulties and dangers of storming any position with the bayonet. The dense column, which in Napoleon's wars decided the battle, will soon be as obsolete as the Greek phalanx. The bayonet itself may be driven from use before the improved rifle, as the old spear and pike were by the musket. An assertion of Halleck, in his "Elements

of Military Art and Science," published as recently as 1846, that "the rifle is useless for the great body of infantry," best illustrates the great change that has taken place in the arms of troops within the last ten or twelve years. In our army the rifle has almost entirely superseded the musket, and the same is true of the British service, and, indeed, of all the European armies.

It is observable, too, and worthy of mention, that, as in our early struggles we demonstrated the value and necessity of skirmishers, and introduced the first of those changes which made an entire revolution in military tactics, so now in this war we are making new discoveries, and learning by experience the real worth of the different arms, and the tactics which will best bring out their advantages. In this respect we are many years in advance of European powers. The tactics of fifty years ago can be changed only by the stern lessons of a dearly bought experience. The repulse of Magruder's heavy columns at Malvern Hill, of Burnside's at Fredericksburg, of Lee's and Longstreet's at Gettysburg, by the annihilating fire of lines of infantry and artillery, decides the question of hurling dense masses in the face of such unobstructed fire; and will deter any American general from butchering his troops in such attacks, sanctioned though they are by the example and precepts of the Great Captain.

Therefore, it has become necessary in attacking to advance in line or in light columns, and to weaken the enemy by a heavy and concentrated fire preparatory to the charge. Nor is the change in defensive tactics less marked. Formerly a line of battle armed with the short-range, smooth-bore musket offered a totally inadequate defence to the attack in column, and bodies of troops massed immediately in rear of the line were relied on to repel the attack by vigorous counter-charges with the bayonet. Now the best manner of arranging troops for defence, when the ground permits, is to place the second line in such a manner that it can fire over the first. But this can only be done on a declivity or hill-side, or where buildings or artificial defences are used. Such, to some extent, was the arrangement adopted by the Rebels at the battle of Fredericksburg. Their first line was posted behind a stone wall running along the foot of the heights, while multitudes of sharpshooters, lining the summits and sides, and occupying the houses, served as a second line, and fired over the first.

The comparative value and importance of cavalry is greatly diminished by the improvements in fire-arms. Halleck, and indeed all the standard military writers, rate the cavalry as second in importance, infantry being first, and artillery third. But in our present war it is proved that artillery is of far greater value than cavalry, and should be

ranked second to infantry alone. While artillery, participating in every engagement, has become an indispensable arm of battle, and in some of the hardest fought actions has proved almost the first arm, cavalry has never appeared on the battle-field with effect, and there is scarcely an instance during the whole course of the war of a charge of cavalry upon infantry. Such cavalry as the cuirassiers of the Old Guard, who under Murat could overthrow and trample under foot whole divisions of infantry, is no longer possible. Our cavalry indeed relies more on the carbine or Sharp's rifle than on the sabre, and fight oftener on foot than on horseback. Its chief value is to scout and reconnoitre, to cover the movements of our own army and watch those of the opposing one, and to make raids through the enemy's country, and on his lines of communication and supply.

The object of General Morris's brief treatise upon infantry tactics is to afford instruction in the formations and movements of troops which recent experience has shown to be most required. They are, in the main, of a simpler and more expeditious character than those formerly prescribed, their chief object being to attain simplicity, celerity, and the least fatigue and exposure to the men. The little volume forms an essential supplement to the earlier works on the subject. It is clear and compact, and deserves to be thoroughly mastered by the officers now in service. It is a valuable addition to our military literature, and, like all of Mr. Van Nostrand's publications, it is carefully printed and appears in a style of unexceptionable excellence.

---

5.—*The Small House at Allington. A Novel.* By ANTHONY TROLLOPE. With Illustrations. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1864. 8vo. pp. 273.

THIS work of Mr. Trollope can be read with pleasure by every one. It contains a fair picture of English country life. The characters are well conceived, and as a rule consistently supported, and there is a pleasant dash of humor and satire about it, not, however, so severe as to disturb the intellectual repose of the most kind-hearted matron.

Mr. Trollope has for some ten years or more been growing in popularity and esteem, which are not undeserved. He has, moreover, won the especial regard of Americans from his honest, though unsuccessful, attempt to gain some insight into American institutions. He caught, indeed, the salient points of our manners and held them up to view with great fairness and good-humored pleasantry, but he was himself aware of his incapacity to penetrate much below the surface, and dis-